NOTES
THE AGENCY THEORY OF THE ATTORNEYCLIENT RELATIONSHIP: AN IMPROPER
JUSTIFICATION FOR HOLDING CLIENTS
RESPONSIBLE FOR THEIR ATTORNEYS'
PROCEDURAL ERRORS
INTRODUCTION

For many years, courts and commentators have struggled with the
question of who-attorney or client-should bear the penalty for an attorney's errors.' During the twentieth century, courts have often resolved the question in cases involving an attorney's procedural errors 2 by
resorting to the agency theory of the attorney-client relationship. In
1962, the Supreme Court, in Link v. Wabash Railroad, explained this
rationale for holding clients responsible for their attorneys' procedural
abuses:
1. Compare Chisler v. Randall, 124 Kan. 278, 259 P. 687 (1927) (client not responsible for
unauthorized defamatory statements of attorney) and Welsh v. Cochran, 63 N.Y. 181 (1875) (attorney's general authority will not render client liable for damages caused by attorney's act of wrongfully directing levy upon goods) with Fairbanks v. Stanley, 18 Me. 296 (1841) (attorney's general
authority to commence suits will render client liable for damages caused by attorney wrongfully
attaching property) and Vaughn v. Fisher, 32 Mo. App. 29 (1888) (client's special direction to attorney not required to render client responsible for attorney's act of wrongfully obtaining sale order).
See generally Note, Mistakes of Law, 10 U. KAN. L. REv. 615 (1962) (supporting trend toward
vacating judgments when attorney's reasonable mistake of law results in judgment against client);
Note, Civil Procedure-Powerof FederalCourts to Discipline Attorneysfor Delay in Pre-trialProcedure, 38 NOTRE DAME LAW. 158 (1963) (arguing that rationale of Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S.
626 (1962), is unfair to innocent clients); Note, Dismissalfor Failure to Attend a PretrialConference
and the Use of Sanctions at PreparatoryStages of Litigation, 72 YALE L.J. 819 (1963) (same).
2. This Note attempts to make an essential distinction between procedural and substantive
conduct. Procedural conduct is any conduct directly related to the management of a suit in accordance with a court's rules of procedure. See 2 F. MECHEM, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF AGENCY
§ 2160 (2d ed. 1914). In other words, procedural conduct is conduct that is either directed toward
the court (e.g., appearing at hearings and conferences and filing pleadings) or directed toward the
opposing party under close supervision of the court (e.g., discovery). In contrast, substantive conduct is directed toward the opposing party or a third party without the supervision of the court (e.g.,
settlement offers and transactional work). Cf. id. For example, substantive conduct includes the
decision to bring a suit, but the drafting and filing of a complaint is procedural conduct. See
Buehman v. Smelker, 50 Ariz. 18, 19, 68 P.2d 946, 950-51 (1937) (attorney controls drafting of
pleadings). The courts' definition of attorney authority also reflects the substance/procedure distinction. See infra note 36 and accompanying text.
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There is certainly no merit to the contention that dismissal of petitioner's claim because of his counsel's unexplained conduct imposes an
unjust penalty on the client. Petitioner voluntarily chose his attorney
as his representative in the action, and he cannot now avoid the conse-

quences of the acts or omissions of this freely selected agent. Any
other notion would be wholly inconsistent with our system of representative litigation, in which each party is deemed bound by the acts of his
lawyer-agent and is considered to have "notice of all facts, notice of
'3

which can be charged upon the attorney."
This Note challenges the Supreme Court's assertion that the agency

theory is the only "notion" consistent with our judicial system. The
Note argues that the agency theory mischaracterizes the attorney-client

relationship and is simply inconsistent with many policies that our judicial system holds important.4 The theory should have no place in the
courts' calculus for tailoring sanctions for an attorney's procedural error.
Instead, courts should rely completely and openly on an analysis of the
policies behind their sanctioning power.

This Note first examines the fairly recent historical development of
the agency theory as a rationale for sanctioning clients for their attorneys' procedural errors.5 Next, it examines the agency theory's incom-

patibility with the implications of the substance/procedure distinction in

attorney authority. 6 The Note then demonstrates the agency theory's in-

consistency with the policy considerations that support dismissal for
want of prosecution 7 and discovery abuse. 8 Finally, the Note describes

the policy concerns that should inform all decisions to impose sanctions
for discovery abuse or want of prosecution. 9
3. 370 U.S. 626, 633-34 (1962) (citing Smith v. Ayer, 101 U.S. 320, 326 (1879)).
4. See infra notes 46-58, 66-81, and accompanying text. Most courts have reacted to these
inconsistencies in one of two ways. Some courts have expressly limited the Link decision. See, eg.,
Carter v. Albert Einstein Medical Center, 804 F.2d 805, 807-08 (3d Cir. 1986). Others have ordered
sanctions inconsistent with the real policies underlying the sanctioning power. See, eg., Damiani v.
Rhode Island Hosp., 704 F.2d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1983) (dismissing innocent client's claim although
goal of deterring discovery abuse would be furthered only by sanctioning attorney); see also infra
notes 67-81 and accompanying text (discussing appropriateness of dismissal in light of deterrence
objective). Some courts, however, have not responded to the inconsistency inherent in the agency
theory and continue to follow Link The First Circuit's most recent decisions have sanctioned clients, based both on client negligence and on the agency theory. See Townsend v. Gray Line Bus
Co,, 767 F.2d 11, 19 (1st Cir. 1985); Damiani,704 F.2d at 16-17. However, strong language in those
decisions approving the agency theory and the outcomes of earlier cases, ag., Corchado v. Puerto
Rico Marine Mgmt., Inc., 665 F.2d 410, 413 (1st Cir. 1981) (no client fault required for client
sanction), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982), indicate that the court will adhere to Link See also
infra note 28 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 10-32 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 33-44 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 46-62 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 63-93 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 94-111 and accompanying text.
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I. A BRIEF HISTORY
A.

OF THE AGENCY THEORY OF THE ATTORNEYCLIENT RELATIONSHIP

The Early English and American Approach.

It is difficult to determine precisely when courts began using the
agency theory to sanction clients for their attorneys' procedural errors.1 0

Very early English cases indicate that on matters of procedure, the client
would not be responsible for the words and conduct of his attorney unless he avowed them.11 Although traces of the practice of avowal remain
as late as the early nineteenth century,12 English courts quickly began
holding non-avowing clients responsible for their attorneys' substantive, 13 and on occasion even procedural, 14 misconduct.
Despite this increased identification of attorneys with clients, Eng-

lish courts remained reluctant to hold completely innocent clients responsible for their attorneys' procedural errors. For example, in the

eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, English courts allowed cases to proceed after an attorney's delay on condition that the attorney personally
pay the costs of delay. 15 These decisions did not address agency consid10. Although a number of early American courts dismissed cases based on attorneys' procedural errors, they did not use an agency theory as their rationale. See eg., Thompson v. Thompson,
3 N.C. (2 Hayw.) 357, 357 (1806) (nonsuit for failure to offer original bill of sale afihmed on grounds
of negligence); Wright v. Thomas, 6 Tex. 420 (1851) (dismissal for failure of attorney to appear at
trial found appropriate without discussion); see also Butler v. Butler, 1 Root 275 (Conn. 1791) (sanctity of record requires that client be bound by attorney's conduct in court).
11. See, e.g., Bygot v. Belet, Y.B. 3 Edw. II 3, fo. 43a (1310), reprintedin 20 SELDEN SOCIETY
128, 129 (1905) (attorney's pleading must be avowed by client before it becomes effective and binding); see also Holmes, Agency, 5 HARV. L. REv. 1, 6 (1891) (in very early English cases, party could
"avoid the loss of his suit.., by disavowing the pleading of his advocate").
12. See Colledge v. Horn, 3 Bing. 119, 121, 130 Eng. Rep. 459, 460 (C.P. 1825) ("I cannot
allow that the counsel is the agent of the party."). Colledge is consistent with the ratification principle of Bygot The court in Colledge granted a new trial to establish wbether the client was within
hearing distance of his counsel's statement at trial, thus implying that an attorney's statement at trial
is not binding on the client unless authorized by the client. Colledge, 3 Bing. at 121, 130 Eng. Rep.
at 460.
13. See, e.g., Tunstall v. Trappes, 3 Sim. 286, 307, 57 Eng. Rep. 1005, 1013 (Ch. 1829) (notice
to attorney of judgment against estate is actual notice to client-purchaser); Winter v. Lord Anson, 3
Russ. 488, 493, 38 Eng. Rep. 658, 660 (Ch. 1878) (notice to attorney of lien against property is
constrnctive notice to client-mortgagee).
14. See, eg., Pisani v. Lawson, 7 L.J.C.P. 144, 144 (1838) (attorney's consent to opposing
party's joinder of pleas binds client); Latuch v. Pasherante, 1 Salk. 86, 86, 91 Eng. Rep. 81, 81 (K.B.
1697) (same). Although the reasons for this change are not clear, the practice of avowal may have
been a response to the poor quality of early legal representation, a response that became unnecessary
as lawyers improved their skills. See 4 Hen. 4, ch. 18 (1402) (statute regulating practice of attorneys
in response to "great Number of Attornies, ignorant and not learned in the Law, as they were wont
to be before this Time").
15. Eg., Townley v. Jones, 8 C.B.N.S. 288, 289, 141 Eng. Rep. 1177, 1177 (C.P. 1860) (allowing case to proceed on condition that attorney pay costs of failure to attend trial); Doe v. Roe, 1
L.J.K.B.O.S. 154, 154 (1823) (same); De Roufigny v. Peale, 3 Taunt. 484, 128 Eng. Rep. 192 (C.P.
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erations; rather, the courts dealt explicitly with such policy considera16
tions as deterrence and protecting the opponent's interests.
Like English courts, American courts allowed cases to proceed after
finding a want of prosecution.1 7 The American courts, however, imposed
the costs of delay on the "party" in whose name the delay occurred, not
allocating blame between attorney and client. 18 Although these early
American cases arguably first applied the agency theory to the attorneyclient relationship, none of them used an agency theory to justify imposing costs on the client.' 9 Courts did not resort to the agency theory for
20
that purpose until the late nineteenth century.
B. Emergence of the Agency Theory.
Between the early nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries, the legal

characterization of the attorney-client relationship changed in a way that
encouraged courts to hold clients responsible for their attorneys' proce-

dural errors. The change originated in a line of mid-nineteenth century
cases that considered the client and attorney the same entity with regard
to the client's notice of substantive facts. 2' Courts soon went beyond
conclusively presuming a client's notice and established a second conclu-

sive presumption of a client's responsibility for an attorney's negli1811) (granting new trial on condition that attorney pay costs occasioned by failure to deliver brief
to opposing counsel); Exparte Smith, 1 Atk. 139, 26 Eng. Rep. 90, 91 (Ch. 1742) ("I by no means
like this practice [of intentional delay], and it is what attornies [sic] in the country are very apt to fall
into; but if they make a custom of it, I shall, for the future, order the costs of the affidavit to come
out of their own pockets.").
16. See Doe v. Roe, I L.J.K.B.O.S. at 154.
17. Eg., Jackson v. Waldron, 5 F. 245, 247-48 (C.C.W.D. Tenn. 1880) (setting aside nonsuit on
grounds of attorney's mistake about competency of evidence, on condition that plaintiff pay costs);
Rogers v. Garrison, 2 Cai. R. 379, 379 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (denying motion for nonsuit based on
attorney's failure to appear at trial, on condition that party at fault pay costs); Jackson v. Brown, 1
Cai. R. 152, 152 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1803) (same).
18. See, eg., Waldron, 5 F. at 247-48 ("the plaintiff will pay all costs of the suit"); Brown, 1
Cai. R. at 152 ("the'plaintiff must pay the costs of not proceeding to trial").
19. Rather than attempting to sanction the person at fault, these cases were concerned with
protecting the opposing party and reaching the merits of the plaintiff's claim. See, eg., Waldron, 5
F. at 247 ("no injury can result to the defendant by re-installing this [case], which is obviously a suit
of merit by the plaintiff"); Brown, I Cal. R. at 152 (sudden illness of plaintiff and attorney acceptable
excuse for delay but plaintiff must pay costs).
20. Compare Nash v. Gilkeson, 5 Serg. & Rawle 352, 354 (Pa. 1819) (court rule requiring that
notice of deposition be given to party not satisfied by notice given to attorney) with Smith v. Ayer,
101 U.S. 320, 326 (1879) ("The law ... considers the [client] as affected with notice of all facts,
notice of which can be charged upon the attorney.").
21. Fg., Smith, 101 U.S. at 326 (imputing to client-principal his attorney's knowledge that
third party held note as executor); Bierce v. Red Bluff Hotel Co., 31 Cal. 161, 167 (1866) (conclusive
presumption that attorney will communicate all facts to client); Williams v. Tatnall, 29 Ill. 553, 564
(1863) (same).
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gence. 22 Without distinguishing between substantive and procedural
matters, courts thus began "deal[ing] with parties as though they were
actually present in the person of their solicitors and as though they knew
23
all their solicitors knew."
For most of the twentieth century, the agency theory has enjoyed
nearly uniform acceptance in the United States.24 American courts have
confidently accepted the proposition that "[a]ny other principle in the
conduct of causes would be exceedingly impracticable. ' 25 Following this
tradition, the Supreme Court in 1962 decided the landmark case of Link
v. Wabash Railroad. In Link the plaintiff's attorney failed to attend a
pretrial conference and the Court affirmed a dismissal of the complaint,
26
justifying the harsh result by resort to the agency theory.
C. Present Status of the Agency Theory.
Despite the bold and broad language of the Link opinion, the
agency theory no longer enjoys unanimous support in the procedural
context. 27 Although First Circuit decisions follow both the letter and
22. See, eg., Nicol v. City of San Francisco, 130 Cal. 288, 290, 62 P. 513, 514 (1900) ("The
counsel's negligence is [the client's] negligence ....); Butler v. Morse, 66 N.H. 429, 430-31, 23 A.
90, 91 (1891) (same) (citing Bierce and Williams); Chambers v. Hodges, 23 Tex. 105, 110 (1859)
(attorney's conduct, even in disobedience of client's instructions, binds client with respect to third
persons).
23. Chadwick v. Parkhill Corp., 16 Del. Ch. 105, 110, 141 A. 823, 825 (1928); see also Gifford
v. Thorn, 9 N.J. Eq. 702, 722 (1855) (party appears before court through attorney). Interestingly,
although English courts have become more willing to hold clients responsible for their attorneys'
procedural errors, they have not adopted the agency theory. See, eg., Allen v. Sir Alfred McAlpine
& Sons, [1968] 2 Q.B. 229, 243-46 (Denning, M.R.) (dismissal of client's claim for attorney's failure
to diligently prosecute based on explicit evaluation of policy concerns).
24. See, eg., Laird v. Air Carrier Engine Serv., Inc., 263 F.2d 948, 953 (5th Cir. 1959) (attorney considered simply as "any other agent"); Rothman v. Wilson, 121 F.2d 1000, 1006 (9th Cir.
1941) (relationship between attorney and client couched in terms of agency); see also Note, Financial
PenaltiesImposed Directly Against Attorneys in Litigation Without Resort to the Contempt Power, 26
UCLA L. REv. 855, 866 (1979).
25. Chadwick 16 Del. Ch. at 110, 141 A. at 825.
26. 370 U.S. 626, 634-36 (1962); see supra text accompanying note 3.
27. Different jurisdictions take very different approaches to apportioning sanctions between attorney and client. Several continue to adhere rigidly to Link See, eg., First Bank v. Carswell, 111
Ill. App. 3d 71, 73, 443 N.E.2d 755, 757 (1982) (default judgment appropriate, despite innocence of
client, when attorney failed to notify client of court date); International Vacuum, Inc. v. Owens, 439
N.E.2d 188, 189-90 (Ind.Ct. App. 1982) (default judgment appropriate when attorney failed to
notify court of changed address and subsequently failed to receive notice of pretrial hearing);
Vanhook v. Stanford-Lincoln County Rescue Squad, Inc., 678 S.W.2d 797, 799-800 (Ky. Ct. App.
1984) (negligence of attorney in failing to appear at trial imputable to client and grounds for dismissal); Kiefer v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 80 Mich. App. 590, 593-94 & n.4, 264 N.W.2d 71,
73-74 & n.4 (1978) (notice given to attorney requiring client to appear at settlement conference
constitutes notice to client).
Other jurisdictions seem to have abandoned the agency rationale of Link See, eg., Battryn v.
Indian Oil Co., 472 A.2d 937, 942 (Me. 1984) (court has inherent authority to sanction attorney for
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spirit of Link,28 the Third Circuit seems to follow neither. 29 Such disdiscovery abuse); Beit v. Probate and Family Court Dep't, 385 Mass. 854, 859-60 & n.11, 434
N.E.2d 642, 646 & n.l1(1982) (attorney who failed to appear at trial should be sanctioned because
"it is unfair and unjust to impose the punishment, for the lawyer's failure to appear, on a client");
Moran v. Rynar, 39 A.D.2d 718, 719, 332 N.Y.S.2d 138, 141 (1972) (attorney's failure to file note of
issue "should not deprive his client of his day in court"); Simmons v. Tuttle, 70 N.C. App. 101, 105,
318 S.E.2d 847, 849 (1984) (dismissal for want of prosecution improper when client not at fault
"because an attorney's neglect will not be imputed to a litigant that is himself free of fault");
Drescher v. Summers, 30 Ohio App. 3d 271, 272-73, 507 N.E.2d 1170, 1172 (1986) (requirement
that party be served with notice prior to dismissal for want of prosecution not satisfied by notice to
attorney). Although none of these jurisdictions have actually overruled cases that employ the
agency theory, their approaches reflect either a de facto abandonment of the theory or the use of a
fairness exception that drains the theory of its vitality.
Other jurisdictions follow various middle roads. For example, the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals will impute an attorney's ordinary negligence to the client, but will not impute gross
negligence. See Lynch v. Meridian Hill Studio Apts., Inc., 491 A.2d 515, 519 & n.8 (D.C. 1985);
Bond v. Wilson, 398 A.2d 21, 24 (D.C. 1979). This approach offers an interesting comparison to the
approach followed in Pennsylvania. In that state, if there is a reasonable explanation for the attorney's neglect, then the negligence will not be imputed to the client. Aiston v. Philadelphia Elec. Co.,
337 Pa. Super. 46, 56-57, 486 A.2d 473, 478 (1984). A court attempting to follow both approaches
could not impute either gross or slight negligence. These approaches are a far cry from Link and
traditional agency law.
Finally, some jurisdictions do not adhere consistently to any approach. See eg., Thode v.
Thode, 190 Conn. 694, 698-99, 462 A.2d 4, 6-7 (1983) (recognizing that court may follow Link and
hold client responsible or may sanction attorney directly). Compare Zaccardi v. Becker, 162 N.J.
Super. 329, 331-32, 292 A.2d 1220, 1222 (despite innocence of client, deterrent goal of discovery
rules requires dismissal), cert denied, 79 N.J. 464, 401 A.2d 221 (1978) with Jansson v. Fairleigh
Dickinson Univ., 198 N.J. Super. 190, 194-96, 486 A.2d 920, 922 (1985) (court should not dismiss
for discovery abuse unless client negligent or opposing party would be prejudiced).
28. See Farm Constr. Servs., Inc. v. Fudge, 831 F.2d 18, 21 (1st Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (citing
Link and affirming dismissal despite client's claim of innocence); Townsend v. Gray Line Bus Co.,
767 F.2d 11, 19 (1st Cir. 1985) (attorney's failure to appear at post-trial conference deemed waiver of
party's right to new trial); Damiani v. Rhode Island Hosp., 704 F.2d 12, 16-17 (1st Cir. 1983)
(dismissal for failure to comply with discovery order despite lack of evidence of client fault);
Corchado v. Puerto Rico Marine Mgmt., Inc., 665 F.2d 410, 413 (1st Cir. 1981) (dismissing claim
for attorney's failure to comply with discovery order is "an unavoidable side effect of the adversary
system"), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982); see also supra note 4.
29. See Carter v. Albert Einstein Medical Center, 804 F.2d 805, 807-08 (3d Cir. 1986). The
Carter court reaffirmed the validity of Link. Nevertheless, it stated that it did not favor dismissal of
a case for attorney errors and applied a four-part test of responsibility, established in Poulis v. State
Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir. 1984), that severely limited Link Carter, 804
F.2d at 807-08; see also Regional Refuse Systems, Inc. v. Inland Reclamation Co., 842 F.2d 150, 153
(6th Cir. 1988) (citing Carter with approval and stating "this circuit has been more ready than
others to reverse dismissals ... especially when it appears that the party is blameless").
The Third Circuit appears to have drifted even further from Link in a recent case, Dunbar v.
Triangle Lumber & Supply Co., 816 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1987). In Dunbar, as in Link, an attorney
failed to appear at several pretrial conferences. Id at 127-28. The district court dismissed for want
of prosecution under FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b). Dunbar, 816 F.2d at 128. The Third Circuit vacated
the dismissal, creating a new procedural requirement of direct notice to the client prior to dismissal.
Id. at 129. The court reached its decision by focusing on the personal responsibility test of Poulis
and Carter and ignoring the agency considerations of Link Id. at 128-29; see also Curtis T. Bedwell
& Sons v. International Fidelity Ins. Co., 843 F.2d 683, 691-93 (3d Cir. 1988) (applying the Poulis
test to district court's dismissal for failure to comply with discovery requests, and finding client
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agreements among authorities on the agency issue are not uncommon
0
and have led to inconsistent decisions. For example, in Knight v. Davis, 3
the defendant's attorney withdrew from the case without informing his
client of the trial date. When the client failed to appear at trial, the trial
court entered a default judgment. The Alabama Supreme Court held
that the normal presumption of communication did not apply and remanded the case for trial.3 1 In McNally v. Stonehenge, Inc, however, a
factually identical case, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed a default
judgment, holding simply that notice to the attorney constituted notice
32
to the client.

Such inconsistencies have resulted because the agency theory re-

flects an inaccurate view of the attorney-client relationship and thus fails
to command consistent acceptance. The next part of this Note explores
contradictions between the agency theory and widely held ideas about
the division of authority in the attorney-client relationship.
II.

A COMPARISON OF THE AGENCY THEORY WITH CONCEPTIONS
OF ATTORNEY AUTHORITY

Courts and commentators have frequently considered the attorney's

authority in the attorney-client relationship. 33 This material shows that
the agency theory is inconsistent with generally accepted characteriza-

tions of that relationship.
As part I of this Note points out, courts have often held clients responsible for their attorneys' procedural mistakes. 34 Yet, courts have
held that an attorney has virtually unrestrained authority to act in procedural or tactical areas.3 5 Indeed, most jurisdictions continue to distinpersonally responsible); Grant v. Clairol, Inc., 113 F.RID. 574, 577-78 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (dismissing
claim for failure to comply with discovery order based on analysis similar to that used in Dunbar).
The Fourth Circuit has drifted yet further from Link A Fourth Circuit panel, consisting of
Circuit Judges Hall and Wilkinson and District Judge Bullock, recently held that a client's innocence qualifies as "mistake" or "excusable neglect" for purposes of FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) and that
"[w]hen the party is blameless and the attorney is at fault, . . . a default judgment should ordinarily
be set aside." Augusta Fiberglass Coatings v. Fodor Contracting, 843 F.2d 808, 811 (4th Cir. 1988)
(per curiam). But see Lolatchy v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 816 F.2d 951, 956 (4th Cir. 1987) (Wilkinson, J., dissenting) (citing "general rule" that attorney delay and neglect should be imputed to the
client).
30. 356 So. 2d 156 (Ala. 1978).
31. Id. at 157-58.
32. 242 Ga. 258, 248 S.E.2d 653 (1978).
33. See infra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
34. See supra notes 3, 23-32, and accompanying text.
35. See, e.g., Moulton v. Bowker, 115 Mass. 36, 40 (1874) ("An attorney at law has authority,
by virtue of his employment as such, to do in behalf of his client all acts, in or out of court, necessary
or incidental to the prosecution and management of the suit ....); Averill v. Williams, 4 Denio 295,
296 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1847) ("An attorney has very plenary [sic] power in the prosecution of a suit to
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guish between procedural matters, in which the attorney has authority,
36
and substantive decisions, in which the client has authority.
This distinction is consistent with research on the actual allocation
of authority in the attorney-client relationship. 37 Moreover, because the
traditional distinction posits that the input of the client-a layperson unable to understand the procedural aspects of a case-is of no value in
connection with procedural issues, 38 courts have often held that an attorney may exercise discretion in procedural matters and may even take
39
actions contrary to a client's instructions.
The substance/procedure distinction, however, does not support the
conclusion that an attorney is the agent of her client in procedural mat-

ters. According to traditional agency law, an agency relationship exists
judgment and execution ....); Huston v. Mitchell, 14 Serg. & Rawle 307, 309 (Pa. 1826) (attorney
fully authorized "to do such things as pertained to the conducting of the suit"); Swinfen v. Chelmsford, 5 Hurl. & Norm. 890, 922, 157 Eng. Rep. 1436, 1449 (Ex. 1860) ("[A] counsel has complete
authority over the suit, the mode of conducting it, and all that is incident to it.").
36. See Valley Line Co. v. Ryan, 771 F.2d 366, 376 (8th Cir. 1985) (filing stipulations is procedural matter within implied authority of attorney); Blanton v. Womancare, Inc., 38 Cal. 3d 396,
403-04, 696 P.2d 645, 650, 212 Cal. Rptr. 151, 155-56 (1985) (attorney has authority to make stipulations or agreements regarding procedure); Hallock v. State, 64 N.Y.2d 224, 230, 474 N.E.2d 1178,
1181, 485 N.Y.S.2d 510, 513 (1984) (conclusion of settlement agreement not within attorney's authority over procedural matters); see also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2
comment 1 (1983) [hereinafter MODEL RULES] (distinguishing between "objectives" and "means").
In the criminal context, compare Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 13 (1984) ("absent exceptional
circumstances, a defendant is bound by the tactical decisions of competent counsel") with Jones v.
Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983) ("accused has the ultimate authority to make certain fundamental
decisions regarding the case"). See also People v. McKenzie, 34 Cal. 3d 616, 631 n.9, 668 P.2d 769,
779 n.9, 194 Cal. Rptr. 462, 472 n.9 (1983) ("Of course, substantive decisions as to what plea to
enter, whether to waive jury trial, and whether to testify are ultimately to be made by the defendant
after consultation with counsel.").
37. Most commentators have concluded that in the typical attorney-client relationship, the attorney exercises almost complete discretion in procedural matters. See, eg., D. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE? 30-34 (1974); Mallor, Punitive Attorneys'FeesforAbuses of
the JudicialSystem, 61 N.C.L. REv. 613, 651 (1983).
38. Martyn, Informed Consent in the Practiceof Law, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 307, 315 (1980).
For an example of the traditional view, see G. ARCHER, ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS OF THE LAWYER
§ 31 (1910) (explaining too fully to client the necessary legal steps serves "no useful purpose").
39. See, eg., Eury v. Huff, 141 F.2d 554, 555 (4th Cir. 1944) (attorney has authority to control
procedural matters independent of client); Buehman v. Smelker, 50 Ariz. 18, 29, 68 P.2d 946, 950-51
(1937) (attorney, as independent contractor rather than servant, controls drafting of pleadings);
Duffy v. Griffith Co., 206 Cal. App. 2d 780, 787, 24 Cal. Rptr. 161, 165 (1962) (attorney "in full
charge of his client's cause or defense"); Board of Comm'rs v. Younger, 29 Cal. 147, 149 (1865) ("So
long as he remains attorney of record the Court cannot recognize any other as having the management of the case."); see also MODEL RULES, supra note 36, Rule 1.2 comment 1 (1983) ("the lawyer
should assume responsibility for technical and legal tactical issues, but should defer to the client
regarding such questions as the expense to be incurred and concern for third persons who might be
adversely affected"). See generally 2 F. MECHEM, supra note 2, § 2160 (client may not interfere with
"due and orderly conduct" of a case); Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decision-making: Informed
Consent and the Legal Profession, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 41, 50-60 (1979) (discussing cases holding that
attorney has authority to act inconsistently with client's instructions).
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only if the principal has "the right to control the conduct of the agent
with respect to matters entrusted in him."' 4° Implicit in this right to control is the idea that the agent has a duty to obey the principal's instructions. 41 Both the judicial decisions excluding the client from the
decision-making process in procedural matters 42 and the research justifying that exclusion4 3 indicate that the attorney has no such duty to obey in
the procedural context. Thus, the attorney more closely resembles an
independent contractor than an agent.44
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14 (1957); see also Lane v. Hopfeld, 160 Conn. 53,
59, 273 A.2d 721, 723-24 (1970) (out-of-state manufacturer had no agent in state for purposes of
service of process); Gross Income Tax Div. v. Fort Pitt Bridge Works, 227 Ind. 538, 546, 86 N.E.2d
685, 689 (1949) (independent subcontractor acts as agent for prime contractor); N & G Constr., Inc.
v. Lindley, 56 Ohio St. 2d 415, 417, 384 N.E.2d 704, 706 (1978) (contractor as agent of owner);
Siskin v. Johnson, 151 Tenn. 93, 98, 268 S.W. 630, 631 (1925) (defendant's employee not considered
agent when defendant exercised no control over activities of employee).
41. See Rianda v. San Benito Title Guar. Co., 35 Cal. 2d 170, 173, 217 P.2d 25, 27 (1950) (en
banc) (principal's instructions determine duty of agent as escrow holder); Dougherty Distillery
Warehouse Co. v. Binenstock, 293 Pa. 566, 569-70, 143 A. 195, 197 (1928) (agent's actions exceeding
scope of authority in sale of whiskey certificates not binding upon principal); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 385.

42. See supra note 39.
43. See supra note 37.
44. For the distinction between an independent contractor and an agent, see GrossIncome Tax
Division, 227 Ind. at 546, 86 N.E.2d at 689; N & G Construction, 56 Ohio St. 2d at 417, 384 N.E.2d
at 706 (agent subject to principal's control, but independent contractor employed to achieve objective, not subject to employer's control).
Some courts have held that a person may not be both an independent contractor and an agent at
the same time. See, eg., Jeff-Cole Quarries, Inc. v. Bell, 454 S.W.2d 5, 14 (Mo. 1970); Crist Sod Co.
v. Bruce, 599 S.W.2d 43, 45 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980). Most courts, however, recognize that the terms
are not mutually exclusive. See, eg., CBS v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., 522 F.2d 369, 375 & n.14 (2d
Cir. 1975); Ackert v. Ausman, 29 Misc. 2d 962, 967, 218 N.Y.S.2d 822, 827 (Sup. Ct. 1961), aff'd,
20 A.D. 850, 247 N.Y.S.2d 999 (1964); accord RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14N comment a.
The most logical approach recognizes that an attorney is an agent with regard to some aspects
of a representation, but an independent contractor or non-agent with regard to other aspects. Cf
Shea v. Bryant Chucking & Grinding Co., 336 Mass. 312, 314, 145 N.E.2d 692, 694 (1957) ("A
person may be an agent or a servant as to one part of an undertaking, and an independent contractor
as to other parts."); Konick v. Berke, Moore Co., 355 Mass. 463, 466, 245 N.E.2d 750, 752 (1968)
("An employee while driving his own car may be an independent contractor, even though he would
be a servant when performing other jobs."). Nevertheless, the Restatement (Second), along with the
vast majority of courts, makes the broad assertion that an attorney is both agent and independent
contractor in procedural contexts. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14N comment a.
Given the opinions holding that an attorney has exclusive control over procedural matters, the
Restatement (Second) creates an unusual and important exception to general agency law. Comment
a of section 385 relieves the attorney/agent of the duty to obey the instructions of the client/principal in procedural matters, despite section 385's own requirement that an agent obey the instructions
of the principal. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 385 & comment a. The exception is based
on the general notion that "the employer will not interfere in the method of conducting proceedings
which are customarily left in the control of the agent." d comment a. But see Parsons v. Martin,
77 Mass. (11 Gray) 111, 115-16 (1858) (broker prohibited from following usage and custom regarding sale of stock when seller gave contrary instructions); W. BOWSTEAD, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF
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The agency theory fails to reflect a client's lack of participation in
procedural matters; further, it contravenes the long-established distinc-

tion between attorney discretion in procedural matters and client discretion in substantive matters. By superimposing agency law onto the
attorney-client relationship, courts and scholars have forced themselves
45
to create awkward exceptions to the central principles of agency law.

III. THE USE OF THE AGENCY THEORY TO JUSTIFY DISMISSAL FOR
WANT OF PROSECUTION

The foregoing discussion has shown how the agency theory clashes
with the real allocation of decision-making authority between attorney
and client. The following two parts of this Note will show that the
agency theory is, in fact, only a convenient justification for the harsh
results dictated by certain policy considerations. This part discusses the
policy considerations underlying one such result, dismissal for want of
prosecution; it then shows that applications of the dismissal power are
consistent with such considerations, but not with the agency theory.
A.

Policies Underlying Dismissalfor Want of Prosecution.
A court's power to dismiss a claim for want of prosecution is of

ancient origin. 46 The early cases speak of the dismissal power as a withholding of relief: a court could refuse its assistance to a plaintiff who
neglected to prosecute his claim in a timely fashion. 47 These early courts
focused on the conduct of the delaying party, emphasizing that a less

than diligent party should not benefit from the court's power. This emAGENCY 117-18 (5th ed. 1912) ("It is the duty of every agent ....
in the absence of express instructions, to act according to ... reasonable usage ....
");
F. MECHEM, OUTLINES OF THE LAW OF
AGENCY § 520 (4th ed. 1952) ("such customs and usages, however, cannot, as between the principal
and the agent, overrule positive instructions to the contrary"). The mischaracterization of the attorney as an agent irprocedural matters probably resulted from the early development of the agency
theory at a time when courts failed to distinguish between substantive and procedural contexts for
the purpose of notice. See supra notes 10-16 and accompanying text.
45. See 2 F. MECHEM, supra note 2, § 2159 (holding client responsible for attorney's management of a case is "contrary to the ordinary rules of agency").
46. See 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *295-96. It has
been generally accepted that the power to dismiss for want of prosecution is an inherent power of the
court, "crystallized" by FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b). See Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31
(1962); Boling v. United States, 231 F.2d 926, 927 (9th Cir. 1956). Rule 41(b) provides in part:
"For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute... a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of
any claim against the defendant." FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b).
47. See, e.g., Bancroft v. Sawin, 143 Mass. 144, 146, 9 N.E. 539, 542 (1887) (refusing to give
"assistance to the plaintiff," who failed to act in a timely fashion on a bill to redeem land from a
mortgage); Forster v. Thompson, 4 Dru. & War. 303, 318-19 (Ir. Ch. 1843) (plaintiff's delay after
filing bill would "disentitle him to [the court's] assistance"); see also W. BLACKSTONE, supra note
46, at *295-96.
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phasis has been carried forward in the general principle that a party,
"even if not at fault, should not be permitted to benefit from the wrong of
her attorney. '48 This consideration is similar to the equitable "clean
hands" doctrine: 49 courts recognize that benefits might accrue to a party
who has delayed, even if unintentionally, 50 and that such a windfall must
5
be avoided, even at the cost of sanctioning an innocent client. 1
The second, closely related consideration underlying dismissal for

want of prosecution is protection of the party adversely affected by the
delay. Many courts, including the Supreme Court in Link, have cited
52
protection of the opposing party as a key factor in their decisions.
These decisions suggest that delay may inflict certain harms on the opposing party (such as deterioration of physical evidence, loss of memory,

or loss of contact with witnesses) that only dismissal of the suit will
53

redress.
A final underlying policy concern is the desire for efficient management of the court system. This consideration, like the previous two, is of
ancient origin and gave rise to the court's power to manage its docket by

dismissing for want of prosecution.54 As court dockets have become increasingly crowded, this policy concern has played a more important role
55
in courts' decisions to dismiss.

48. Anderson v. Air West, Inc., 542 F.2d 522, 526 (9th Cir. 1976) (Rule 41(b) involuntary
dismissal upheld).
49. "There must be conscience, good faith, and reasonable diligence, to call into action the
powers of the court." McKnight v. Taylor, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 161, 168 (1843).
50. Although a client may be perfectly innocent, she may benefit if defendants, relying on the
delay, destroy records, move to other occupations, terminate contact with witnesses, or do other acts
that cause irreparable harm to their cases. See Anderson, 542 F.2d at 525; Pearson v. Dennison, 353
F.2d 24, 28 (9th Cir. 1965).
51. See infra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
52. See Link, 370 U.S. at 634 n.10 ("But keeping this suit alive merely because plaintiff should
not be penalized for the omissions of his own attorney would be visiting the sins of plaintiff's lawyer
upon the defendant"); see also Reizakis v. Loy, 490 F.2d 1132, 1135-36 (4th Cir. 1974) ("lack of
prejudice to the defendant" influenced reversal of district court's dismissal); Flaska v. Little River
Marine Constr. Co., 389 F.2d 885, 889 (5th Cir.) (delay not excessive enough to require dismissal),
cert. denied, 392 U.S. 928 (1968); Reno v. International Harvester Co., 115 F.R.D. 6, 9 (S.D. Ohio
1986) (insignificance of prejudice to defendant influenced reopening of plaintiff's case). See generally
Note, Involuntary Dismissalfor Disobedience or Delay: The Plaintiffs Pligh4 34 U. CHi. L. REV.
922, 932-35 (1967) (discussing appropriateness of unconditional dismissals to protect defendant's
interests).
53. See Note, supra note 52, at 935.
54. See Jackson v. Sutphen, 2 Cow. 457 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1824); Rogers v. Garrison, 2 Cai. R. 379
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (Livingston, J., dissenting); see also Link 370 U.S. at 630-31 (The power to
dismiss "has generally been considered an 'inherent power,' governed not only by rule or statute but
by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly
and expeditious disposition of cases.").
55. Cf Link, 370 U.S. at 631-32 n.7 (discussing courts' attempts to establish formal procedures
for dismissing stale cases in light of docket congestion). For another modem case citing court con-

744

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1988:733

B. Applications of the Dismissal Power.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b), a federal court has
power to dismiss an action for want of prosecution.5 6 In exercising this
57
power, a court need not consider any of the three policies noted above.
As long as the Rule is violated, the court can order dismissal, regardless
of whether the client was actually at fault. 58 Thus, the agency theory
seems technically consistent with Rule 41(b).
Despite Rule 41(b)'s unconditional grant of authority, however,
courts do not in fact exercise the power to dismiss until evaluating the
three policy concerns, and they pay only occasional lip service to agency
law in this context. For example, in Carter v. City of Memphis, 59 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit noted its power
under Rule 41(b) and Link to dismiss the plaintiff's employment discrimination claim based on his attorney's failure to comply with a pretrial order. Nevertheless, the court evaluated the competing policy
concerns and reversed the dismissal without ever addressing the implica61
tions of an agency relationship. 6° In Shea v. Donohoe Construction Co.,
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit approached
the problem whether to dismiss an innocent client's personal injury claim
by engaging in a lengthy discussion of policy concerns. The court never
considered holding the client responsible under an agency theory and
instead reversed the dismissal, stating, "We look disfavorably upon dismissals as sanctions for attorney misconduct or delay unless the client
himself has been made aware of the problem, usually through notice from
the trial court."62
These cases show how little weight courts give the agency theory
when exercising the power to dismiss for want of prosecution. In a typical agency relationship, the agent's negligence will be imputed to the
principal based on the relationship alone. In the attorney-client relationship, however, errors of the attorney are imputed to the client only when
certainpolicy concerns are satisfied. Although the difference in reasoning
gestion as a basis for the power to dismiss, see Quagliano v. United States, 293 F. Supp. 670, 672

(S.D.N.Y: 1968). See generally Note, supra.note 52, at 935-37 (discussing merits of unconditional
dismissal to clear dockets and avoid congestion).
56. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b); see also supra note 46 (quoting the rule in part).
57. See supra notes 47-54 and accompanying text.

58. See FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b).
59. 636 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1980).
60. Id. at 161. For other examples of cases in which courts had power to dismiss, but either
exercised it or refused to exercise it on the basis of policy considerations, without evaluating agency
issues, see Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1423-25 (9th Cir. 1986); Blois v. Friday, 612 F.2d

938, 940 (5th Cir. 1980); Moran v. Rynar, 39 A.D.2d 718, 718-19, 332 N.Y.S.2d 138, 141 (1972).
61. 795 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1986).

62. Id. at 1078.

Vol. 1988:733]

ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP

is subtle, the difference in result is striking. If A injures B, and A is C's
agent, then B has a cause of action against C. If, however, A is an attor-

ney and C a client, then even if the relationship between A and C meets
the same agency-law requirements, B cannot be certain that a court will
hold C responsible for the delays caused by A.
IV.

THE USE OF AGENCY THEORY TO JUSTIFY SANCTIONS FOR

DISCOVERY ABUSE

Perhaps no other aspect of procedural law is analyzed as frequently
as the use of sanctions to combat discovery abuse. 63 Although Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 37 enumerates the sanctions available to a district court, 64 it has done little to resolve the confusion that many courts

experience when considering which sanction to apply. 65
As with the issue of dismissal for want of prosecution, 66 courts can
generally determine when to impose discovery sanctions by reference to
various policy considerations. Rule 37(b) does allow a court to hold an
innocent client responsible for his attorney's discovery abuses, thus permitting, rigid application of the agency theory. In applying the Rule,
however, courts have not acted in a manner consistent with the agency
theory, but rather in accordance with the policies underlying the sanctioning of discovery abuse.
63. See, eg., Brazil, The Adversary Characterof Civil Discovery: A Critique and Proposalsfor
Change, 31 VAND. L. REv. 1295, 1298-305, 1348-61 (1978); Renfrew, Discovery Sanctions: A Judicial Perspective, 67 CALIF. L. REv. 264, 272-78 (1979); Note, Rule 37 Sanctions: Deterrentsto Discovery Abuses, 46 MoNT. L. REV. 95, 96-98 (1985); Note, Discovery Abuse Under the FederalRules:
Causes and Cures, 92 YALE L.J. 352, 364-67 (1982) [hereinafter Note, Discovery Abuse]. The most
common discovery abuses include failure to respond to interrogatories, see, eg., Robison v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 368 F.2d 37, 38 (10th Cir. 1966), failure to respond to requests for production of
documents, see, eg., Coleman v. Smith, 814 F.2d 1142, 1145 (7th Cir. 1987), and requests for nongermane information, see, eg., Edgar v. Slaughter, 548 F.2d 770, 771 n.1 (8th Cir. 1977).
64. The Rule, in relevant part, provides:
If a party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated under
Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails to obey an order to provide or
permit discovery,... or if a party fails to obey an order entered under Rule 26(f), the court
in which the action is pending may make such orders in regard to the failure as are just,
and among others the following: ... (C) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof,
or staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient
party ....
FED. R. CIv. P. 37(b)(2).
65. See, e.g., Associated Radio Serv. Co. v. Page Airways, Inc., 73 F.R.D. 633, 636 (N.D. Tex.
1977) (attorneys who failed to produce discovery conference report should bear costs); SEC v. Los
Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage Exch., 24 F.R.D. 460, 467 (S.D. Cal. 1959) (vacating order to
strike made under Rule 37(b)); Golleher v. Horton, 119 Ariz. 604, 606-07, 583 P.2d 260, 262-63
(1970) (reversing dismissal for failure to comply with discovery order because client not at fault);
Battryn v. Indian Oil Co., 472 A.2d 937, 941-42 (Me. 1984) (trial court has discretion to impose
sanctions for discovery abuse on attorney, client, or both).
66. See supra notes 46-62 and accompanying text.

DUKE LAW JOURNAL
A.

[Vol. 1988:733

Policies Underlying Discovery-Abuse Sanctions.

Rule 37, which governs the imposition of sanctions for discovery
abuse, reflects two policy concerns. One is concern for a complete and
fair adjudication of a case's merits. 67 In light of this concern, the Advisory Committee on Rules stated in 1952 that the function of Rule 37 was
to compel proper discovery, not to punish violators. 68 This early focus
on using Rule 37 to achieve "specific performance" of discovery requests
is consistent with the goal of providing sufficient evidence for a full adjudication on the merits.
The other concern underlying Rule 37 is the philosophy that a trial
is "not a contest, but an endeavor to ascertain the truth and an effort to
attain justice." 69 Rule 37 thus attempts to deemphasize the adversarial
nature of a suit by punishing those parties who abuse the discovery
70
process.
The tension between the two concerns is obvious. If a court focuses
on reaching the merits of a case, it must tailor sanctions to facilitate complete and orderly discovery.7 1 If, however, a court focuses on curbing
adversarial excesses, it must place a greater emphasis on strict compli72
ance with the discovery rules and must tailor sanctions to deter abuse.
In the early years of Rule 37, concern for reaching the merits of a
73
dispute outweighed the goal of deterring abusive discovery tactics.
Courts manifested their concern for reaching the merits by treating violations of the Rule leniently.7 4 For example, in SEC v. Los Angeles Trust
67. See Holtzoff, Originand Sources of the FederalRules of Civil Procedure,30 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1057, 1059-60 (1955) (discussing shift away from rigidity of earlier procedural forms).
68. FED. R. Civ. P. 37 advisory committee's note. The Committee distinguished between enforcement and punishment based on two Supreme Court cases: Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas,
212 U.S. 322, 350-54 (1909) (court may compel production of necessary evidence), and Hovey v.
Elliott, 167 U.S. 409 (1897) (court may not use dismissal to punish).
69. Holtzoff, supra note 67, at 1060 (emphasis added).
70. See Note, FederalDiscovery Rules: Effects ofthe 1970 Amendments 8 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROBS. 623, 642 (1972). In an effort to reduce adversarial tension, the Advisory Committee
amended the rule, causing it to apply to "failure" to comply rather than "refusal." The Committee
also altered the burden of proof by requiring fees unless the losing party could justify its actions.
71. See SEC v. Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage Exch., 24 F.R.D. 460, 466-67 (S.D. Cal.
1959) (refusing to impose harsh sanctions in order to reach merits).
72. See Note, supra note 70, at 624 (discussing tension between creating enforceable and effective rules that promote efficiency, and retaining enough flexibility to reach the merits of a dispute).
73. See, eg., Note, The Emerging Deterrence Orientation in the Imposition of Discovery Sanctions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1033, 1034, 1039-40 (1978) [hereinafter Note, Deterrence Orientation];

Note, Sanctions Under Amended Rule 26-Scalpelor Meat-ax? The 1983 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 183, 192 (1985).
74. See, eg., Dorsey v. Academy Moving & Storage, Inc., 423 F.2d 858, 860-61 (5th Cir. 1970)
("The court, however, should not go beyond the necessities of the situation to foreclose the merits of
controversies as punishment for general misbehavior."); Robison, 368 F.2d at 39 ("The office of
37(d) is to secure compliance with discovery rules, not to punish erring parties.") In Robison the
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Deed & MortgageExchange,7 5 a district court explicitly addressed these
competing policy considerations as it contemplated the proper penalty
for a party's failure to comply in good faith with a discovery request.
The court stated:
We simply do not consider the procedural point, concerning the scope
of the Federal Rules and the powers of the court (although undoubtedly important), as being important enough to justify the avoidance of
full litigation of the substantive issues of the case. Therefore we are
not disposed to adopt any remedy at this time which affects the posture
of the issues in this matter .... 76
Over time, however, courts began to shift from a remedial to a deterrent approach. 77 Motivated by increasingly crowded dockets7 s and
growing dissatisfaction with the lower courts' lenient interpretations of
Rule 37,79 the Supreme Court, in NationalHockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 80 approved the imposition of sanctions to deter
future abuses. The Court thus demonstrated its willingness to
subordinate the interest of reaching the merits to that of deterring "those
who might be tempted to such conduct in the absence of such a
deterrent." 8 '
B. Applications of Discovery-Abuse Sanctions.
82
The recent emphasis on the deterrent effects of Rule 37 sanctions
has increased the frequency and severity of sanctions, including the extreme measure of dismissal. On its face, the resulting increase in dismissals reflects a willingness to hold clients responsible for their attorneys'
abusive tactics and thus suggests an application of agency principles.
Nevertheless, a close reading of the discovery abuse decisions indicates
that courts impose sanctions without regard to agency theory.
Because the "American Rule" requires each party to pay its own
court seemed most concerned with the substantive effects of the parties' willingness to delay and
discoufited the trial court's impatience. Id.; see also Note, DeterrenceOrientation,supra note 73, at
1038-40, and cases cited therein.
-75. 24 F.R.D. at 460.

76. Id. at 467.
77. This shift is well-documented. See, e.g., Sofaer, SanctioningAttorneys for Discovery Abuse

Under the New FederalRules: On the Limited Utility of Punishment, 57 ST. JOHN'S L. Rnv. 680,
680-84 (1983); Note, Deterrence Orientation,supra note 73, at 1044-47 (1977); Note, Sanctions Im-

posed by Courts on Attorneys Who Abuse the JudicialProces, 44 U. CH. L. REv. 619, 632 (1977);
Adams & Nolin, Discovery Curbed. PretrialAbuses Now Punished by U.S. Courts, Nat'l L.J., Mar.
17, 1986, at 15, 18.
78. See infra note 97 and accompanying text.
79. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
80. 427 U.S. 639 (1976) (per curiam).
81. Id. at 643.
82. See infra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
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litigation costs, 8 3 a litigant has many opportunities to impose costs of
litigation on its opponent through discovery abuse. The result of such
abuse is to (1) externalize the abusing party's costs84 and (2) increase the

settlement value of the case.8 5 Although most courts do not engage in a
technical discussion of externalities, some courts recognize that, in order
to deter discovery abuse, they must force parties to internalize the costs
of discovery that benefits them.8 6 To enforce internalization, the courts
must identify who-between attorney and client-is responsible for the
87
alleged abuses, and sanction that individual.

Decisions that reflect comparative fault-finding (to compel the inter-

88
nalization of discovery-abuse costs) generally ignore the agency theory.

83. See Leubsdorf, Toward a History of the American Rule on Attorney Fee Recovery, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1984, at 9 & n.1; Note, Discovery Abuse, supra note 63, at 353-54.
84. An externalized cost is a cost created by the activities of one party and then passed off onto
another party or even onto society as a whole. See A. Pioou, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 183
(4th ed. 1932). A party does not evaluate an externalized cost when deciding to engage in the
activity that produces it. This leads the party to do more of the activity than is efficient. See J.
DAVIS & J. HULETT, AN ANALYSIS OF MARKET FAILURE: EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC GOODS, AND
MIXED GOODS 8-12 (1977). Abusive tactics allow parties to externalize the costs of discovery: the
abusive party can receive desired information while forcing the opponent to expend time and money
to discover it firsthand. When using abusive tactics to externalize the costs of discovery, a party can
decide to discover information without having to consider the real cost of obtaining it. Because
parties will take full advantage of cost-free benefits, the possibility of externalization encourages
litigants to create more discovery costs than are really necessary, thus reducing the overall efficiency
and increasing the overall costs of the discovery process. For an excellent discussion of this phenomenon, see Note, Discovery Abuse, supra note 63, at 356-64.
85. See Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedureand JudicialAdministration, 2 J.
LEO. STUD. 399, 420 (1973).
86. That is, the costs of discovery must be imposed on the responsible actor herself. See Note,
Discovery Abuse, supra note 63, at 364-67; see also cases cited in Adams & Nolin, supra note 77, at
17.
87. See Sofaer, supra note 77, at 710-13 (discussing need to sanction attorney when attorney at
fault).
88. Cases that employ the comparative fault-finding approach and decline to dismiss do not
even address the agency issue, but instead emphasize the deterrence issue. For example, in Batson v.
Neal Spelce Assocs., 765 F.2d 511, 514 (5th Cir. 1985), the court noted that a district court, before
dismissal, must consider whether the neglect was "plainly attributable to an attorney rather than a
blameless client . . . ." The court then based its decision on the policy implications of National
Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639 (1976) (per curiam), reh'g denied,
429 U.S. 874. Batson, 765 F.2d at 515-16. See also Butler v. Pearson, 636 F.2d 526, 531 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (vindication of judicial process and protection of litigants better served by not dismissing when
client not at fault); Edgar v. Slaughter, 548 F.2d 770, 773 (8th Cir. 1977) ("When non-compliance is
the result of dilatory conduct by counsel, the courts should investigate the attorney's responsibility
.... "); Ali v. A & G Co., 542 F.2d 595, 597 (2d Cir. 1976) (Oakes, J., dissenting). As theAli dissent
stated:
the trial court should first consider the more specific andperhapseven more deterrentremedy of imposing costs personally on the offending attorneys. Imposing a penalty on those
responsible for wasting the court's time, while not dismissing a party's potentially valid
claim, seems to me to make the punishment better fit the crime ....
Ali, 542 F.2d at 597 (emphasis added).
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This makes sense: if these courts applied the agency theory, they would
sanction clients without apportioning blame between clients and

attorneys.
Other decisions display a brute force approach to deterrence, imposing harsh sanctions on the client in the belief that the sanction will deter
future abuse and eventually reach the person at fault.8 9 Decisions employing this approach are not motivated by the agency theory, but rather
by a strong concern with deterrence, frequently based on a real perception of client fault. For example, in Cine Forty-Second Street Theatre
Corp. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp.,90 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit justified its affirmance of dismissal by citing
Link and the agency theory. The court, however, made clear that its
decision was necessary "in this day of burgeoning, costly and protracted
litigation," and also noted that the client was aware of and involved in
every aspect of the case. 91

In the context of discovery-abuse sanctions, as with dismissal for
want of prosecution, although courts frequently cite the agency theory,
the theory fails to command their consistent adherence. The modern
concern for deterrence, tempered by the desire to reach the merits of a
dispute, dominates the decisionmaking process. The agency theory only
obscures the courts' reasoning and introduces uncertainty into the sanctioning process. 92 One can only guess the meaning of decisions that, in a

single page, cite the agency theory as a justification for sanctioning the
Cases that have affirned dismissals using the internalization approach often cite the agency
theory as a justification, but the clear message of these cases is that the suits were dismissed because
of client conduct, not because of the agency theory. See, eg., Coleman v. Smith, 814 F.2d 1142,
1147 (7th Cir. 1987) (defendants' own negligence rendered moot the issue whether gross attorney
negligence could relieve defendant from default judgment); United Artists Corp. v. La Cage Aux
Folles, Inc., 771 F.2d 1265, 1270-71 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Link, but holding: "[i]n light of our
conclusion that [the client] was partly at fault,.. . we affirm the dismissal").
89. See, eg., Tolliver v. Northrop Corp., 786 F.2d 316, 319 (7th Cir. 1986) ("Holding the client
responsible for the lawyer's deeds ensures that both clients and lawyers take care to comply.");
Urban Elec. Supply & Equip. Corp. v. New York Convention Center Dev. Corp., 105 F.R.D. 92, 99
(E.D.N.Y. 1985) (deterrent effect served by dismissal; client has remedy against attorney); see also
T.E. Quinn Truck Lines, Ltd. v. Boyd, Weir & Sewell, Inc., 91 F.R.D. 176, 182 (W.D.N.Y. 1981)
("The client is not excused from his counsel's nonfeasance unless extraordinary circumstances
exist.").
90. 602 F.2d 1062 (2d Cir. 1979).
91. Id. at 1068 & n.10; see also Damiani v. Rhode Island Hosp., 704 F.2d 12, 16-17 (1st Cir.
1983) (citing Link, but noting that "[the entire pattern of behavior by plaintiff's counsel casts a
shadow on the bona fides of his client's case, particularly since an antitrust action requires the close
cooperation of attorney and client at every stage of the lawsuit").
92. For example, in Damiani,704 F.2d at 16, the court endorsed the agency theory as a justification for dismissal and mentioned the possibility of client fault only in passing. Thus, although the
court might have affirmed the dismissal because of client fault, the case seems to mandate consideration of the agency theory when courts tailor sanctions for discovery abuse.
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client and then dismiss the theory as moot. 93
V. REPLACING THE AGENCY THEORY WITH A UNIFIED APPROACH
TO POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

This Note has shown that the agency theory inaccurately characterizes the attorney-client relationship and is inconsistent with the courts'
real motivations in sanctioning an attorney's procedural misconduct. Indeed, the theory's relatively recent origin suggests that it developed as a
convenient justification for the harsh results of giving certain policy con-

siderations full effect. 94 This analysis casts doubt on the validity of Link

and decisions following the Link rule.
If courts abandoned the agency theory, they would have to replace it

with a judicial mechanism that would consistently determine when to
hold clients responsible for attorney errors. The appeal of the agency

theory is its ease of application: the proper result, regardless of fault, is
to sanction the client. If courts abandoned the agency theory, however,

they could (and would have to) deal explicitly with the policy concerns
underlying their sanctioning power. Although this approach would give
the trial court wide discretion, it would also make outcomes more pre-

dictable, because parties would no longer have to guess whether a court
would apply the agency theory. 95
93. For example, in United Artists Corp. v. La Cage Aux Folles, Inc., 771 F.2d 1265 (9th Cir.
1985), the court stated:
By upholding the dismissal, we may be penalizing Danon more than his prior counsel.
However, we have previously stated in affirming a dismissal: "it must be remembered that
Appellant voluntarily chose [his attorneys] as his representative[s] in the action, and he
cannot now avoid the consequences of the acts or omissions of [these] freely selected
agent[s]."
In light of our conclusion that Danon was partly at fault for the failure to comply with
the discovery requests, we affirm the dismissal.
Id. at 1271 (citation omitted). The court, while referring to the agency theory, thus relied upon the
client's conduct to justify dismissal.
94. The agency theory's use for this purpose is not surprising. "[Clommon sense is opposed to
the fundamental theory of agency" that a principal is liable for the conduct of his agent. Holmes,
supra note 11, at 14-15. The theory arose only from the exigencies of an industrialized world, see F.
MECHEM, supra note 44, §§ 352-62; Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 YALE L.J. 105, 111
(1916), and from the desire to compensate innocent, injured persons. See Limpus v. London Gen.
Omnibus Co., 1 Hurl. & C. 526, 539, 158 Eng. Rep. 993, 998 (Ex. D. 1862) ("there ought to be a
remedy against some person capable of paying damages"). Thus, the agency theory has traditionally
served as a legal justification for harsh and otherwise illogical results. Cf. Laski, supra, at 112 (vicarious liability is "simply a legal attempt to see the individual in his social context"). Whether one
finds these original purposes appropriate or not, agency rules are now positive law, cf id at 106
("Nowhere has it been so difficult to win assent to what some have deemed fundamental dogma."),
with new applications that have little to do with loss-spreading under tort law, as cases like Link
make clear. When applied in these new ways, however, the rules seem hollow, in part because they
are severed from their "macro" justification.
95. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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This Note concludes by discussing the policy considerations that
should inform decisions allocating fault for procedural errors between
attorney and client.
A. Deterrence and Court Congestion.
Although the concerns of deterrence and court congestion are not
identical, 96 both stem from the growing backlog of civil cases.9 7 If the
backlog results from the increased abusive activity of attorneys in each
case, then courts must tailor sanctions for want of prosecution and discovery abuse to reduce that activity.
Use of the agency theory simply cannot deter delay and discovery
abuse and also reduce civil case backlogs. First, deterrence requires in-

ternalization of costs, 98 and by requiring the client to bear the costs of
her attorney's errors, the agency theory allows the attorney to engage in
abusive activity without direct sanction, since the client incurs the cost of
such activity. Although a sanctioned, but innocent, client may bring a
malpractice action against her attorney, 99 the difficulty of prevailing in a

malpractice action may effectively prevent internalization of the attor96. It is easy to imagine that a dismissal for an attorney's gross negligence might result in
appeals or satellite malpractice litigation that could substantially repeat the underlying litigation.
The deterrence interest could be served, but with increased crowding of court dockets. See Link v.
Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 649 (1962) (Black, J., dissenting).
97. The statistic most frequently cited as the cause of the backlog is the tremendous increase in
the number of cases filed. In 1951, the number of civil cases filed in the federal courts was 41,455.
H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM

52 (1953). In

1960, the number totaled 59,284, and in 1983, 241,842. Civil Case Backlogs in FederalDistrict
Courts: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Courts of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,98th Cong.,
1st & 2d Sess. 14 (1983-84) fiereinafter Civil Case Backlogs] (statement of Elmo B. Hunter, Senior
U.S. District Judge). But case filings per district court judge have actually declined since 1943. W.
MCLAUCHLAN, FEDERAL COURT CASELOADS 171 (1984).
One study of the causes of the civil case backlog suggests that the delay between the filing and
disposition of a given case is primarily a function of the amount of litigation activity (such as discovery and pretrial conferences) that the parties and their attorneys choose to conduct: "Stated most
simply, cases in which lawyers and judges do more, take longer to reach disposition." Civil Case
Backlogs, supra, at 74-75 (statement of Deborah R. Hensler). According to Hensler's study, courts
can "increase their control over the pace of litigation" by limiting the amount of litigation activity
"to that which is essential to achieve an equitable resolution of the dispute." Id. at 75.
Another researcher, Steven Flanders, also believes that increased judicial control over litigation
activity would help curb the backlog. S. FLANDERS, CASE MANAGEMENT AND COURT MANAGEMENT IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS 25-27 (1977). Flanders found that the districts with
the fewest average days between filing and the end of discovery are also the districts with the most
discovery requests per case. Id. at 26-27. According to Flanders, this fact, as well as the surprisingly small average number of discovery initiatives per completed case, indicates that the method
rather than the volume of discovery is most responsible for the delay. Id. at 27-28.
98. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
99. Renfrew, Discovery Sanctions: A Judicial Perspective, 2 REv. LIT. 71, 82 (1981).

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1988:733

ney's costs. 1°° Second, even if malpractice actions provided a viable
means of requiring the attorney to absorb the cost of his own errors, the
satellite malpractice litigation would negate any reduction in the civil
caseload.
Because clients often are not responsible for their attorneys' errors, 0 1 courts should completely abandon the rigid agency theory and,
to the greatest extent possible within the context of the primary litigation, pinpoint the person responsible for the abuse or delay. This approach would more effectively deter abusive discovery and delay, and
would also reduce the backlog of civil cases.
B. Protection of the Opposing Party'sInterest.
In contrast to the concern with reducing the civil case backlog, the
interest in protecting the party potentially prejudiced by the attorney's
conduct focuses only on the case at hand.102 In this context, the court
may not be concerned with finding fault, but its use of the agency theory
to tailor sanctions remains inappropriate. If, for example, an attorney
failed to prosecute diligently, causing vital evidence to deteriorate, the
only means of protecting the opposing party might be to dismiss the case,
despite the client's innocence. If, however, the delay only caused a monetary loss, the proper sanction under an internalization approach would
be to impose costs on the attorney.103 Neither the comparative-fault approach nor the agency theory suggests the remedy that best protects the
prejudiced party's interests. Courts can find that remedy only by considering the practical effect of each available sanction on the prejudiced
party.
C. Adjudication of the Merits.
The agency theory is also inappropriate in promoting the Federal
Rules' general policy of providing full adjudication of the merits, 104 since
a strict application of the agency theory could easily deprive an innocent
100. See Note, supra note 24, at 867-68 (attorney has all of client's defenses as well as his own, in
addition to intimate knowledge of client's affairs).
101. See Rothman, Excessive Discovery: A Client's View, 1984 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 304, 304-08
(client generally unaware of discovery abuses).
102. See generally Scott, Two Models of the Civil Process, 27 STAN. L. REV. 937, 937-40 (1975)
(distinguishing between the Conflict Resolution Model and Behavior Modification Model).
103. This was precisely the approach of the early English courts. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
104. See Holtzoff, supra note 67, at 1059-60.
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client of a meritorious claim.10 5 A court, however, can best promote its
interest in adjudicating the merits by pinpointing the person at fault.
Only when the client is at fault is the dismissal justified; otherwise, the
10 6
attorney should be sanctioned and the case allowed to proceed.
D.

Attorney-Client Privilege.

Few cases have addressed the inherent tension between the attorneyclient privilege 10 7 and the need to pinpoint the person at fault.10 8 A
court's attempt to determine precisely who is at fault, without resorting
to a separate action, could lead to an awkward and potentially prejudicial
situation in which the client can waive the privilege, but the attorney
cannot. 109 Only if the client brings a separate action against the attorney
can the attorney reveal privileged information to defend herself. 110 Thus,
after the court reviews all available evidence and determines that the attorney-client privilege protects the evidence required to determine fault,
the court must subordinate its interests in determining fault and hold the
client responsible for the attorney's errors. 11 This does not imply, however, that upholding the attorney-client privilege requires using the overbroad agency theory. A case-by-case determination of the available
evidence would protect the attorney-client privilege while also promoting
the other interests served by pinpointing fault.
CONCLUSION

Perhaps courts still mention the agency theory when sanctioning in-

nocent clients in order to impute a certain amount of culpability to the
clients. Such a rationale makes harsh results seem less harsh. Nevertheless, the agency theory has never provided an accurate characterization
105. See, eg., Townsend v. Gray Line Bus Co., 767 F.2d 11, 19 (1st Cir. 1985). Although the
Townsend court noted that the client may have been guilty of serious neglect, it appeared willing to
deprive an innocent client of an otherwise meritorious claim. Id. at 18-19.
106. See N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. § 3042, at 1977 comment C3042:16 (McKinney Supp. 1988).
107. See MODEL RULES, supra note 36, Rule 1.6 (1983).
108. The issue arose in Custom Craft Carpets, Inc. v. Miller, 137 Cal. App. 3d 120, 187 Cal.
Rptr. 78 (1982), in which a California appellate court stated: "[w]ithout invading the attorney-client
privilege, we have no means of determining whether it was the client or counsel who was responsible
for pressing this litigation and imposing on both the trial and appellate courts." Id. at 123, 187 Cal.
Rptr. at 80. The court affirmed the sanctions imposed on the client, reasoning that the client benefited from the delay and could obtain relief, if appropriate, from the attorney in another forum. Id.,
186 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
109. See Comment, Settling a Case: A Court's Inherent Power to Impose Sanctions Before and
After Eash v. Riggins Trucking, Inc., 38 RUTGERS L. REv. 539, 551 (1986).
110. MODEL RULES, supra note 36, Rule 1.6(b)(2).
111. For an example of this approach, see Custom Craft, 137 Cal. App. 3d at 123, 187 Cal. Rptr.
at 80. The approach is logical, given the client's (less than optimal) opportunity to bring a malpractice action, in which the attorney could defend herself with privileged information.
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of the attorney-client relationship. Its recent origins in the procedural
context suggest that it arose for reasons other than logical necessity.
Moreover, it is inconsistent with the substance/procedure distinction in
attorney authority. Finally, it clashes with the policy concerns involved
in want-of-prosecution and discovery-abuse cases.
For the sake of consistency, predictability, and clarity of reasoning,
courts should abandon the agency theory and rely directly on the policy
concerns involved in deciding whether to sanction a less than diligent
attorney or a relatively innocent client. In Cardozo's words: "Few rules
in our time are so well established that they may not be called upon any
day to justify their existence as means adapted to an end."1 12
William R. Mureiko

112. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 98 (1921).

